Abstract A two-party quantum private comparison scheme using GHZ states and error-correcting code (ECC) was introduced in Li et al.'s paper [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 52: 2818Phys. 52: -2815Phys. 52: , 2013, which holds the capability of fault-tolerate and could be performed in a none-ideal scenario. However, this study points out there exists a fatal loophole under a special attack, namely the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. A malicious party may intercept the other's particles, firstly executes the Hadamard operations on these intercepted particles and his (her) own ones respectively, and then sequentially performs twice CNOT operations on them and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. As a result, the secret input will be revealed without being detected through measuring the auxiliary particles. For resisting this special attack, an improvement is proposed by applying a permutation operator before TP sends the particle sequences to all the participants.
Introduction
Since quantum mechanics principles are introduced into cryptography, quantum cryptography attracts more and more attention. Due to the characteristic of quantum unconditional security, many quantum cryptography protocols, such as quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] [2] [3] , quantum direct communication (QDC) [4] [5] [6] [7] , quantum secret sharing (QSS) [8] [9] [10] , quantum teleportation (QT) [11, 12] , have been proposed to solve various secure problems.
Recently, quantum private comparison (QPC) has become an important branch in quantum cryptography. Based on the properties of quantum mechanics, the participants can determine whether their secret inputs are equal or not without disclosing their own secrets to each other. In 2009, Yang et al. [13] put forward a pioneering QPC scheme based on Bell states and a hash function. Since then, a large number of QPC protocols utilizing the entangled states, such as EPR pairs, GHZ state, etc., have been proposed [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] .
However, these QPC protocols [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] are feasible in the ideal scenario but not secure in practical scenario where faults (including noise and error) are existent in the quantum channel and measurement. In order to solve the problem, in 2013, Li et al. [24] present a novel QPC scheme based on GHZ states and error-correcting code (ECC) against noise. But, through analyzing Li et al.'s QPC scheme, we find it is unsecure under a special attack, called the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. To be specific, if any malicious party performed the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack, he (she) can get another's secret input, which goes against the QPC's principles [25] . In order to fix the loophole, a simple solution by adopting a permutation operator before TP distributes the particles to the participants, is proposed.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. At first, Li et al.'s QPC protocol is briefly reviewed in Sect. 2. And in Sect. 3, we analyze the security of Li et al.'s QPC protocol by introducing the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, and give an improvement to fix the problem. Finally, a short collusion is drawn in Sect. 4.
Review of Li et al.'s QPC protocol
In the Ref. [24] , in order to guarantee the QPC protocols secure in the practical scenario, Li et al. present a new two-party QPC scheme by using error-correcting code. The whole protocol consists of eight steps as below.
(1) Alice, Bob and Calvin prepare a [m, n] error-correcting code which uses m bits codeword to encode n bits word and can correct l error bits in codeword with the error-correcting function D(x m ) according to the fault rate of the noise scenario. We suppose the error-correcting code's generator matrix is G, and check matrix is Q. Then they encode X = (x 0 , x 1 , ..., x n−1 ) and Y = (y 0 , y 1 , ..., y n−1 ) to X ′ = (x 
(2) Calvin prepares m triplet GHZ states all in
where |0 and |1 are measured in Z basis, |+ and |− are measured in X basis, and |± = 1 √ 2 (|0 ± |1 ). Calvin divides these m GHZ states into three sequences S A , S B and S C , which includes the first, the second, and the third particles of all GHZ states, respectively. In Ref. [24] , the authors claimed the scheme was secure even in the practical scenario. However, we will show how a malicious party gets the other's secret input by launching the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack in the next section. As analyzed in Ref. [24] , due to the decoy photons adopted in the Li et al.'s QPC protocol, some well-known attacks, such as intercept-resend attack, measurementresend attack, and entanglement-resend attack, can be detected via the checking mechanism. Unfortunately, we find Li et al.'s QPC protocol cannot resist a special attack, i.e., the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack. To be specific, if any party (Alice or Bob) performs the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, he/she can get the other's secret input. The detailed procedure of the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack is depicted as follows.
Without loss of generality, we suppose Bob is malicious, who wants to get Alice's secret input. At first, Bob prepares m auxiliary particles all in the state |0 e , then, the GHZ state and an auxiliary particle compose a composite system:
where the subscript C, A, B represent the particles in the hand of Calvin, Alice, Bob, respectively, and the subscript e represents the auxiliary particle. In
Step (3), when Calvin sends the sequence S * A to Alice, Bob may intercept S * A and execute a Hardmard (H) operation on every particle in S * A to form sequence S * * A . Then, he performs a controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation C Ae on every particle in S * * A and the corresponding auxiliary particle e. Here, the particle in S * * A is the control qubit, while particle e is the target qubit. After that, Bob performs another H operation on every particle in S * * A in order to restore sequence S * * A to S * A , and sends S * A to Alice. What should be noted is that the transmitting sequence S * A remains unchanged. Since Calvin announces the decoy photons' positions in Step (4), Bob can discard the auxiliary particles e which correspond to the decoy photons in S * A . And in Step (5), after Bob recovers S B by discarding the decoy photons, he executes an H operation on every particle in S B to form sequence S * * B . Then Bob performs a CNOT operation C Be on every particle (control particle) in S * * B and the corresponding auxiliary particle e (target particle). After that, he performs a H operation on every particle in S * * B , which aims to restore S * * B to S B , and every auxiliary particle, respectively. Now, the state of the composite system is changed into
From Eq. (5), a rule can be concluded: if e is |+ , particle A and particle B are in the same state; and if e is |− , they are in the different states. After Alice announces X ′′ = (x 
, that is to say, he can get Alice's secret input x ′ i . For sake of clearness, the above procedure of the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack can be intuitively demonstrated by the following figure (See Fig. 1 ).
The improvement
In order to fix the loophole of Li et al.'s QPC protocol, we meliorate it by applying a permutation operator before TP sends the particle sequences to all the participants. To be specific, Step (3), Step (4) and Step (5) in the original protocol need to be revised as follows. the message qubits. Then Alice and Bob measure these decoy qubits in the same bases and announce their outcomes. If the error rate exceeds a rational threshold, Calvin aborts the protocol and restarts from Step (1); otherwise, there is no eavesdropper, and the protocol continues to the next step. For simplicity, we take a simple two-bit private comparisonas example without considering error-correcting code and the decoy photos. In the case, suppose Alice's input is 10, Bob's input is 11, and Calvin prepares two GHZ states all in the state as Eq. (3),
In
Step (3) * , Calvin executes a permutation operator Π m=2 on sequence S ′ A and S ′ B , then the system may be changed into
After Bob performs the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, the composite system which consists of GHZ state and auxiliary particle becomes 
From above equation, we cannot get the correlations between the states of {A 1 , B 1 } or {A 2 , B 2 } according to the the final state of the auxiliary particle e 1 or e 2 . That means, Bob cannot steal Alice's input through measuring the auxiliary particles. So, we can say the improvement can resist the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack.
Conclusione
In all the QPC protocols, in order to ensure the protocol's security, we must guarantee any participant only knows his (her) own secret input without obtaining another' secret input. In this paper, we firstly review and analyze Li et al.'s twoparty QPC protocol, and find it cannot resist the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, i.e., if one participant Bob launches this attack, he (she) can get the other's secret input without being detected. For avoiding this loophole, we adopt the permutation operator to rearranges the quantum sequences sent to Alice and Bob from Charlie. The delicate analysis shows the security of our improvement can be guaranteed well and truly.
